

A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

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Shannon Nichole Huntley
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by

SHANNON NICHOLE HUNTLEY

APPROVED:

Dr. Robert S. Ehlers

Dr. Jeff Dailey

Dr. Mark Pullin

May 2, 2014

APPROVED:

Dr. Susan Keith
Dean of the College of Graduate Studies

DEDICATION

To my family who has always shown me love and support, my friends who have always challenged me to push my knowledge further and constantly engage in global affairs discussions, and to my professors who have shown great patience and strength during this endeavor, I say thank you for all of that. I would not have been able to complete this project without all of you.

ABSTRACT

The topic of research is an analysis of the intelligence community's (IC) roles and responsibilities during catastrophic events in overseas locations. The research has involved gathering and studying journal and news articles about IC involvement in disaster relief and national security protection during disastrous events. A comparative analysis was done from the gathered information and examination of two cases -the 2010 Pakistan Floods and the July 7, 2005 London Bombings. Analysis of these events led us to conclude that the IC's function in HA/DR operations was in line with the IC's primary function. Further, it played an important role in mitigating suffering while countering potential human threats in the midst of these chaotic events. Finally, we conclude that the IC's involvement in natural disasters is an effective combination of support to disaster-relief efforts and a furthering of national-security interests because in a man-made disaster, relief and policy efforts are intertwined.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHANGING REALITIES

In August 2010, nearly a decade after the hunt for Osama bin Laden (OBL) began, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a breakthrough in their search. The CIA was able to identify a large, secure compound where deliveries were made by identifying and tracing a courier believed to be the personal courier of OBL.¹ This led President Obama to issue an order of surveillance and estimates on the ability for a military strike.²

CIA Director Panetta, at the request of the President, reached out to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the US Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) to coordinate joint operations for performing assessments on capture versus kill operations and abilities.³ The Intelligence Community (IC)-JSOC-USSOCCOM coalition gave the President and the National Security Council (NSC) a list of options that could be most effective in eradicating the OBL threat. Throughout the talks with the President and NSC, the IC had surveillance in the way of satellite imaging (IMINT) and intelligence operatives gathering information (HUMINT).⁴ The IC was gathering as much information as possible on that location to relay to the military operatives that would be carrying out whatever operation was chosen.

¹ Govern, Kevin H. "When States Choose to use Military Force." *Military Legitimacy Review* (2012): Accessed February 17, 2014. <http://militarylegitimacyreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Govern-71.pdf>.

² New York Times. "How Osama Bin Laden Was Located and Killed." *New York Times* (New York), May 8, 2011, 5.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The Guardian. "CIA tactics to trap Bin Laden linked with polio crisis, say aid groups | World news | The Guardian." Accessed February 17, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/02/aid-groups-cia-osama-bin-laden-polio-crisis>.

Operation Neptune Spear resulted in the killing of OBL. It was made possible and effectively executed because of the role the IC played in the operation. However, too often successes like Neptune Spear and publicly perceived failures such as 9/11 are the ones that come to mind when discussing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This perception is not unreasonable, especially since the frame of reference normally comes from studying, or in some cases having lived through, the Cold War era where high-profile intelligence was not uncommon. It also stems from policy reports referencing the main threat of the time (in today's world terrorists). While the IC's primary objective is to protect national security through information gathering and analysis for policymakers and military operations, the means by which this intelligence is gathered is multi-faceted as is the choice of agency for the collection and analysis efforts. This means that the IC, on the authority of the President, has the ability to monitor threats associated with natural and man-made disasters overseas, in conjunction with our allies. These efforts may counter direct threats enabled by the disasters or prevent man-made disasters, thus enhancing American national-security stature and international prestige.

The intelligence capabilities associated with man-made disaster and the human threats often spawned by natural disasters are vitally important to the IC when participating in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts. These kinds of operations are often targeted opportunistically by extremist groups, making them a perfect place for IC assets to enter a region/country for the purposes of gathering intelligence, preventing attacks, and eliminating extremist threats.⁵ Multiple questions remain regarding the appropriateness

⁵ Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey G. Engstrom and Abby Doll. Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR146.

of intelligence organization involvement in HA/DR, regardless of capabilities. These questions include: Should HA/DR involvement be a priority or secondary function, and how does this impact US national security? Hopefully, this question and the attention it receives in this work will begin a dialogue about whether international strategies can be adapted to disaster situations within the US without creating complications. However, this larger question of the IC's proper role in domestic HA/DR events is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of the research question, this work holds to a single key question: Does (or should) the IC play a prominent role in international disaster relief? International HA/DR operations will refer to the international relief efforts after disaster strikes, and for the purpose of this paper, will be comparing intelligence strategies for both natural and man-made disasters.

The IC is comprised of sixteen (16) separate agencies⁶ that exist to ensure policymakers/decision-makers who are meant to protect national security have the information to make well informed and, hopefully, deliberate decisions on the best and safest courses of action. The IC does this through intelligence gathering and analysis, and the analyses are compiled in the form of assessments/estimates that provide a gauge for threat level and international relationships. The IC had its beginnings in 1947 with the establishment of the CIA as part of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 1947). Other agencies followed over time, at which point they worked out a division of labor in terms of each agency's responsibilities and capabilities within the collective IC effort. The intelligence gathered by the IC is used by both policy makers and military organizations in their pursuit of protection of the country and its people, and to maintain the current balance

⁶ ODNI. "Members of the IC." Accessed February 17, 2014. <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic>.

of power within the international community. The IC's involvement in HA/DR has been prevalent since at least the 1980s with military intelligence involvement⁷, but the importance of the role has increased in the past 13 years (post-9/11) due to the increased need for active intelligence. Also, there has been an increase in catastrophic events that requires US aid efforts and resources, including intelligence.

Although there has been a notable increase in intelligence involvement in natural disasters post-9/11, a spike in intelligence involvement in HA/DR operations can also be pinpointed to the post-Cold War transition. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (between 1989 and 1993), US military intelligence alone was involved in no less than 68 percent of HA/DR operations that elicited US intervention.⁸ In addition to military intelligence involvement, intelligence agencies like the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) engaged because of their specific functions. (In the case of the NGA the function is satellite imaging in order to gain visuals and pinpoint affected locations.) All of these capabilities evolved during the Cold War between the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union). When the Cold War ended, the capabilities were still present, but in some cases without obvious utility. During the transition period from the Cold War to 9/11, the focus shifted toward HA/DR.⁹ This was not necessarily a change of directions, but an extension of capabilities beyond the more direct aspects of national security. In other words, national security benefitted because IC action in disaster relief

⁷ Wolf, Andrea. "Global Threats: The Role of Intelligence in Health and Humanitarian Crises." *Federation of American Scientists*. November 8, 1996. <https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/health.htm>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Constantine, Ted G. *Intelligence Support to Humanitarian-Disaster Relief Operations*. Langley: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1995. <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015038563345;view=1up;seq=19>.

protects and promotes American interests internationally. Why and how this is so will be explained in subsequent chapters.

PURPOSE AND FOCUS

In order to address the appropriateness of IC involvement in HA/DR efforts, and the questions arising from it, this work provides an in-depth study of the use of intelligence in HA/DR using two case studies—the Pakistan floods and the London bombings—as analytical lenses. This in turn illustrates how IC involvement in such events can be enhanced and implemented in the future to promote U.S. national security, while assisting disaster victims and protecting them from human threats. It will also serve as an argument for future and more in-depth involvement. The centerpiece of this effort is therefore a qualitative analysis that will interpret past trends through case-study analysis and then provide assessments of the future role of the IC in HA/DR situations. This analysis will address how to enhance the effectiveness of IC involvement in this process and where improvements are necessary. This work focuses on the 2010 Pakistan Monsoons and subsequent floods (a natural event) and the 2005 London Bombings (a man-made event) because of their strategic importance at the time they occurred. The literature and the variables analyzed in the review will allow for an effective assessment of their utility when applied to events reviewed in the case studies.

The research for these case studies involved a literature and intelligence-source-material review that explores a variety of means in which intelligence use is vital in HA/DR efforts (variables), including the use of different means of intelligence gathering, the protective role of intelligence, the role of stability promotion, and other considerations. With the source-materials clearly explained, this work then analyzes cases that exemplify intelligence

responses, one being a natural event and the other being a man-made event. From the detailed assessment of the cases the following hypotheses can be examined:

H₁: Involvement in HA/DR efforts works as a primary function of the IC.

H_n: Involvement in HA/DR efforts does not work as a primary function of the IC.

H₂: The IC's involvement is more substantial in the natural disasters than in the man-made disasters.

H_n: The IC's involvement is not more substantial in natural disasters than in the man-made disasters.

For the above hypotheses, “primary functions” refer to protecting national security. “Substantial involvement” means the IC is able to play a major role in aiding in the efforts to minimize the effects of the disaster and mobilizing HA/DR efforts in a timely manner without being seen as an antagonistic force engaged in espionage. The concluding chapter of this work will summarize the analyses of these four variables to project the optimum future utility and impact of IC involvement in HA/DR efforts. It will include an explanation of information gaps in the study that may occur for any reason. It will also serve as a summation of multiple facets of the IC actions, and what those facets are, to serve as a model to predict future outcomes. Through these examinations, the work concludes with an assessment of the proper future of the IC involvement in disaster relief along with a brief discussion of the potential for domestic implementation of IC support to HA/DR actions via fusion centers and other information-sharing organizations.

CHAPTER II

SOURCE AND LITERATURE REVIEW

It is difficult for the IC to receive recognition for its HA/DR work due to the primarily classified functions it performs, and to the way HA/DR is viewed by governmental entities. Government assistance in disasters is publicly seen as monetary assistance through the United Nations (UN) and through other government-aided private organizations. The IC has a largely unexamined history of providing strategic support in the humanitarian arena, but there is an established precedence. This examination of the IC's role in HA/DR efforts and a clear understanding of it is lacking due, in large part, to the classified nature of IC activities. Also, in the case of the natural disasters, the IC and other government entities are unable to determine the human threat environment until after the disasters. At that point, the skills that the IC can provide include the intelligence-collection methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signal intelligence (SIGINT), and pre-existing relationships and resources globally.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION METHODS

The methods of intelligence collection are useful to the HA/DR arena because they can also be used for viewing and controlling areas of various sizes, from the province level to small perimeters in offensive/defensive situations. They can also be used to view and direct the deployment of security and other personnel. Further, they provide the necessary information to deliver sufficient aid to affected areas while providing better communications means for relief workers.¹⁰ Relief agencies, like the UN and USAID (United States Agency

¹⁰ United Nations Foundation. "Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies". *Harvard Humanitarian Initiative*, 2011.

for International Development), have the capacity to provide aid in the form of on-the-ground and monetary assistance, but their intelligence capabilities are not on the same level as the IC so they rely heavily on its methods. These include HUMINT, IMINT (in conjunction with GEOINT), OSINT, and SIGINT.

For relief organizations to be most effective, they need real-time, or near-real time, intelligence. This is made possible, in addition to other methods, by eyes on the ground, or officers gathering and sorting information from affected locations. This collection method is classified as HUMINT, and it is the oldest form of intelligence gathering. While it is not 100 percent accurate, good human-intelligence providers are very reliable sources. Under the best circumstances, it can provide support to and protection of relief workers on the ground and information to intelligence and government offices regarding threats that generally cannot be gathered through aerial reconnaissance or signals interception. While non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other entities are thus able to deliver aid to devastated individuals and regions, HUMINT sources can also provide information on devastation origins (whether the disaster is natural or man-made), and whether there are active terror or other human threats seeking to manipulate situations to further their agendas. The latter effort protects aid workers and affected populations alike.

In fact, in such a chaotic state, the US government must provide a level of protection to aid workers, and the IC's HUMINT approach lets the government know when the conditions change and if conditions change to the point where protective actions will no longer suffice to keep people safe. This support also provides information and directions to affected groups through various emergency response systems established in the aftermath of

<http://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/publications%20-%20crisis%20mapping%20-%20disaster%202.0.pdf>

the disasters.¹¹ This is done by calling on intelligence officers already stationed in the region, or by requesting assistance from deputized people already working with intelligence forces in the region. This effort relies heavily on local peoples NGOs, and international governmental organizations (IGOs) in the region sharing information with the IC. The indigenous people and workers in the region are the first to know what is happening and what measures need to be taken and are the first means of determining crisis levels.

Another benefit of using HUMINT assets is the cost-effective measure of employing in-place and highly contextually and culturally aware assets to gauge the threat climate and level of chaos on the ground.¹² An example of this need can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake where HUMINT introduction provided more substantive communication content regarding where rioting was happening, and whether it was safe to deploy aid workers or continue airdrops of relief supplies.¹³ The real-time information flow made it possible to sort through the rumors (noise) and accurate reports (intelligence). It also provided a crucial human and local voice to complement and corroborate intelligence gleaned from aerial coverage of the affected location.

IMINT (the intelligence gathered via satellite imaging and aerial photography), or GEOINT (geospatial intelligence) as it is now called, is a discipline of the intelligence arena that is used in HA/DR missions as a means of tracking the devastation and viewing affected areas. It is also a secondary method of determining the threat climate on the ground, and although it is still a comparatively new discipline, it has proven its worth in recent HA/DR

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

efforts.¹⁴ The strength of this source, in addition to that of the analysts in charge of gathering, assessing, and disseminating intelligence, comes from the frequency with which satellites gather images and rotate in and out of position.¹⁵ It is most effective when used in conjunction with other intelligence sources.

As one researcher has noted, “Delineation of damaged areas is critical to the safety and effectiveness of responders and recovery personnel operating in the harsh post-disaster environment,”¹⁶ and tracking such damage is made easier through high-resolution image capturing, analysis, and dissemination. Unlike HUMINT collaboration, IMINT/GEOINT capabilities can be used from any location, meaning that the IC is able to aid in efforts without the necessity of deployment. Accordingly, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)—the authority on IMINT/GEOINT collection and analysis—is among the first agencies to be called upon for HA/DR cooperation and is specifically the facilitator for distribution of geospatial and related intelligence.

The aforementioned reports can be considered a form of open-source intelligence (OSINT), but this source incorporates all data taken from readily attainable and unclassified sources (media, social media, hearsay, etc.).¹⁷ OSINT is closely related to HUMINT because, in some cases, data are retrieved from human sources, but the distinguishing factor

¹⁴ Poteat, S. Eugene. "HUMINT, SIGINT and now GEOINT." *Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies* 20, no. 2 (2013): 3-4. Accessed March 2, 2014. http://www.afio.com/publications/Poteat_HUMINT_SIGINT_and_now_GEOINT_INTEL_FALLWINTER2013_Vol20_No2.pdf.

¹⁵ Simonovic, Slobodan P., and P. Eng. "Role of remote sensing in disaster management." (2002).

¹⁶ David Shaw 2008. Capturing Hurricane Katrina Data for Analysis and Lessons-learned Research Final Report, Mississippi State University. <http://www.serri.org/publications/Documents/MSU%20Project%2063884%20Final%20Report%20-%20Phase%20I%20%28Shaw%29.pdf>

¹⁷ Steele, Robert D. (1997). *Open Source Intelligence: What is it? Why is it Important to the Military?* Volume II. http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040320/fb893cded51d5ff6145f06c39a3d5094/OSS1997-02-33.pdf

is the public-access feature. In HA/DR situations, numerous reports arrive simultaneously, and as a result many news outlets publish conflicting statements that only add to the confusion and chaos. Collecting these reports and comparing them to the reliable intelligence already collected makes the IC crucial for providing an accurate information baseline and explanation of facts. The IC can provide accurate estimates of the situation, and the relief workers can then disseminate those reports to dispel rumors while using them to maximize the effectiveness of their relief efforts and take any required protective measures.

Specifically in the case of social media, OSINT is best used to provide a continuum of information to the people in affected areas. It also can be used to determine the mindset of the affected populace, since they also use social media to report on the situation in hopes of getting necessary information to and from loved ones and relief officials (albeit sometimes incorrect information). This source is generally appropriate for educating impacted populations about the facts in order to dispel rumors¹⁸ and promote stability. Rumors can spread rapidly with live-update capabilities, but so can the truth if the IC uses the proper sources and disseminates them in a timely fashion.

The 2010 Haiti earthquake showed the level of importance of employing different intelligence disciplines in conjunction with one another. The US took the lead on humanitarian operations through the US Agency for International Development (USAID). This agency relied heavily on OSINT and IMINT because they allowed employees to achieve a high level of situational awareness before deploying.¹⁹ These reports also showed

¹⁸ "Social Media in Emergency Management." Online Course, FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Washington, DC, October 31, 2013.

¹⁹ Petitjean, MAJ Mirielle M. "A Guide to Intelligence Support to Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance." *Journal of US Intelligence Studies* (2011): 2-9. Accessed March 8, 2014. http://www.afio.com/publications/Petitjean_ISR_Spt_to_HA_DR_draft_for_future_AFIO_INTEL.pdf.

the level of awareness of the people affected by the earthquake through the monitoring of social media outlets, and what was necessary to calm them while keeping the situation secure (providing situational awareness through those same social media outlets and through traditional media). Another example can be seen in the case of the 2010 Pakistan floods.

The US and Pakistan utilized OSINT as a way to propagate information to provide situational awareness and to provide information to deter the proliferation of incorrect information. Because there was little to no media coverage of the Pakistani floods in the United States, social media and foreign media sources were the primary modes of OSINT gathering.²⁰ In this case specifically, social media proved to be a powerful source for the Pakistani people as a way to relay information as the situation unfolded.²¹

OSINT, much like HUMINT, provides the US government with an understanding of the threat climate in an affected region. Specifically, the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) provides a comprehensive report containing unclassified information from different sources to prepare policymakers for action after an international catastrophic event.²² This includes an understanding of the mental state of the people in the midst of the devastation. This helps analysts to discern potential threats coming from affected people who believe that action is not being taken, or from opportunistic terrorist groups with ties to local populations.

Another method of intelligence gathering, SIGINT, has not played as large a role in HA/DR as the other methods in recent events, and in fact was not used in the case of Haiti.²³ It does, however, have a history of playing a major role by picking up radio and other distress

²⁰ Sardar, Sheheryar T., and Benish A. Shah. "Social Media, Censorship, and Control: Beyond SOPA, PIPA, and the Arab Spring." *U. Pa. JL & Soc. Change* 15 (2011): 577.

²¹ Sheth, Amit, Ashutosh Jadhav, Pavan Kapanipathi, Chen Lu, Hemant Purohit, Gary Alan, and Wenbo Wang Smith. "Chapter Title: Twitris-a System for Collective Social Intelligence."

²² Humanitarian Information Unit. (n.d.). *U.S. Department of State*. Government Website. Retrieved April 2, 2011, from <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/hiu/>

²³ Ibid.

calls in affected regions. It also has been used to pick up indicators of hostile intent in advance of man-made disasters or after natural ones. It has come to be a method for providing situational awareness during HA/DR events when adequate intelligence is not available through IMINT/GEOINT. In addition, it is used as a method of protection from further damage that any human actors may wish to inflict in the wake of the natural disaster.

SIGINT, or signals intelligence, involves electronic interception and communication to gather information.²⁴ It is primarily a method of protection against further damage or threat of attack in the midst of devastation than of aiding in the disaster relief operations. It provides the vital coverage of known threats in the affected regions, and it keeps watch on known potential threats while searching for as-yet undiscovered ones through monitoring signal sources. In addition, it can serve as a method of clandestine communication between command centers at incident sites and off-site (“remote”) command centers.

THE PROTECTIVE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

A defining factor of catastrophic disasters is the chaos they cause. This tends to grow without a swift humanitarian and intelligence response. Chaotic situations are the perfect breeding grounds for enemies to carry out attacks. Consequently, in addition to the aiding humanitarian agencies like the UN or USAID with routine information inputs, the IC also plays an important protective role in catastrophic events. This involves both protection against foreign threats and internal threats, and it concerns both the affected groups and the relief workers providing assistance. This is well documented in the case of the Canal Hotel bombings in Baghdad.

²⁴ Wilner, Alex. *Making the World Safe for Canada Canadian Security Policy in a World of Failed States*. Halifax, N.S.: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2008. Accessed March 22, 2014. <http://www.aims.ca/site/media/aims/failedstates.pdf>.

In late 2003 there was a series of bombings on the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq (the UN headquarters in Iraq since the 1990s) that were meant to deter HA/DR efforts in the midst of Iraqi turmoil. They were orchestrated by al-Qaeda, and differed from then-expected attacks because they targeted civilian-aid workers instead of military forces.²⁵ The first attack was orchestrated on August 19, 2003, and the second came on September 22, 2003. These attacks led to the evacuation of over 600 UN relief workers and many other non-UN affiliated relief workers.²⁶ The attacks also exposed the gaps in protection for HA/DR workers, and showed a need for the protective role of the IC for relief workers.²⁷

Protection in the immediate aftermath of a disaster involves different elements, not only the potential threats themselves, but the different aspects of HA/DR that are involved when providing protection. Consequently, "Identifying and monitoring most risks involves inter-governmental partnerships among local jurisdictions and higher governmental authorities with greater available resources."²⁸ Emergency planners implement contingency plans to assess risks in newly devastated environments and mitigate further threats, but these planners, like relief workers, do not have the same available resources as the IC. Among these are the access to more government agencies than government emergency-planning agencies (emergency management is under DHS, but the IC has access to an even greater number of government agencies); access to local governments and citizens through

²⁵ CNN.com International - Breaking, World, Business, Sports, Entertainment and Video News. "CNN.com - Truck bomb kills chief U.N. envoy to Iraq - Aug. 20, 2003." Last modified August 20, 2003. <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/19/sprj.irq.main/>.

²⁶ Ghattas, Kim. "BBC NEWS | Middle East | Mixed feelings over UN Iraq role." BBC News - Home. Last modified August 11, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6941560.stm.

²⁷ UN News Service Section. "United Nations News Centre - UN wrestling with security questions one year after Baghdad bombing - Annan." Last modified August 19, 2004. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11679&Cr=19&Cr1=August#.UzYyOVyCZZg>.

²⁸ Perry, Ronald W., and Michael K. Lindell. "Preparedness for emergency response: guidelines for the emergency planning process." *Disasters* 27, no. 4 (2003): 336-350.

operatives working within affected regions; and greater access to surveillance controls within a region to protect against the very threats that concern the IC. They also do not maintain the same abilities to minimize the likelihood of a high profile and particularly damaging event such as a NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) spill or attack. An attack is far less likely than a spill or accident because of the amount of surveillance surrounding this type of material, but surveillance does not stop the possibility of such an attack. An attack by a state actor is very unlikely due to the fear of massive retaliation. However, extremist organizations set out to cause as much devastation as possible, and if they can do so using NBC they will not hesitate. Regardless of the method of such materials being unleashed, the outcome is equally devastating. The IC has the ability to track movements of such critical materials, and to detect and intercept communications regarding critical and potentially hazardous materials as well as those relating to any other type of threat.

As stated above, the IC must coordinate with local law enforcement and governments in order to maintain security, but there also needs to be coordination to ensure that problems do not arise when providing protective measures (detection, prevention, and mitigation). In order to detect potential threats in the direct aftermath of disasters, a level of coordination and cooperation above reproach is required to achieve optimal information gathering/sharing for protection from said threats.²⁹

The agencies within the IC have improved their protective abilities since the failure of 9/11. The belief was that such a catastrophe was highly improbable, so there was no real

²⁹ Tomisek, Steven J. "Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense." *Strategic Forum* 189 (2002): 1-14. Accessed March 22, 2014. http://channelingreality.com/Digital_Treason/e-Gov/Homescam_Security_Strategic_Forum_No_189.pdf.

contingency plan for protection during or immediately after the attacks.³⁰ In order to ensure there was no repeat of such events, the IC made improvements to measures for detection and protection from threats.

THE IC'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The US IC-international community relationship has become increasingly complex in recent years. There are more levels to this exchange due to increased agencies within the IC and more actors in the international community taking part in the exchange. The need for international cooperation makes a healthy international interaction vital for the IC. The IC “maintains robust ‘liaison’ relationships with many countries around the world.”³¹ Publicly, however, the interaction between the IC and the international community has been an uneasy one because of the perpetual belief that the IC infringes on other countries’ privacy and obtains their secrets to help the US government keep tabs on the rest of the world. While this is not necessarily inaccurate, it impairs the IC’s interactions with the international community, and in the last decade (especially with the increase of natural disasters and terrorist attacks), healthy interactions have become even more vital.

The success of the IC is rooted in its ability to conceal the majority of its operations abroad. In order to remain useful, covert operations cannot be interrupted by foreign entities; namely intelligence or government entities. Unfortunately, these interruptions are not completely avoidable, and they work in both directions. For example, one of the most protected assets of the IC is also one of the most vulnerable: cyber. “Foreign intelligence and

³⁰ McConnell, Allan, and Lynn Drennan. "Mission Impossible? Planning and Preparing for Crisis 1." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 14, no. 2 (2006): 1-12. Accessed March 22, 2014. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2006.00482.x.

³¹ Rosenbach, Eric and Aki Peritz. "Intelligence and International Cooperation." Memorandum, "Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community," *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School* (2009).

security services have penetrated numerous computer networks of US Government, business, academic, and private sector entities...”³² This is a reciprocal interaction as the IC engages in the same behavior for collecting information on countries with which the US interacts.³³

However, the IC does not only engage in adversarial exchanges with the international community. Like international intelligence agencies/communities, the US IC shares intelligence when it aids the international community without harming US interests. The IC makes it a point to share intelligence with international intelligence agencies, especially with allies, when it benefits both national and international security (a common theme throughout the IC).

The open interaction with the IC provides accessibility, speed, insight, and cover for assets operating in support of American interests. In other words, the IC can and does use allied relationships to gain and disseminate intelligence that otherwise would not be available for exchange. It can also gather and provide intelligence and utilize it to combat threats in a timely manner. Lastly, it can gather intelligence and provide information to allied localities, and utilize local liaisons to provide cover for said operations. The relationship also provides a channel for actionable relationships between the IC and the international community to carry out military as well as HA/DR operations should the need arise simultaneously.³⁴

The advantages of maintaining relationships between the IC and the international community far outweigh the disadvantages, especially in the HA/DR relationship. The IC is able to engage in the reciprocal information-sharing function to track devastation and,

³² Ibid.

³³ United States. *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2008. Accessed April 7, 2014.
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=2&vote=0168.

³⁴ Ibid.

depending on the type of catastrophic event, threats (both known and anticipated) to aid workers and the affected populations.

To further examine the hypotheses and assertions set forth here, the following chapters examine the role of the IC in HA/DR efforts through specific case studies. The first one, the 2010 mass flooding of Pakistan, highlights the role of the IC in a significant natural disaster. On the other hand, examination of the 2005 London Bombings provides insight into the IC's role in a man-made disaster. Both of these serve as models to identify IC involvement in HA/DR efforts, and serve as templates to be improved upon for potential future roles of the IC in HA/DR efforts, whether in the international or domestic arenas.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

THE 2010 PAKISTAN FLOODS

In 2010, Pakistan was hit with an unusually strong monsoon season that led to flooding in the majority of the country, with rains lasting from July through August. It was the worst flood and natural disaster in the country's history, and it left 78 out of 141 districts negatively affected (one-fifth of Pakistan).³⁵ In addition to the land area impacted, roughly 20 million people were displaced or otherwise affected; in addition to the 2,000 people who lost their lives and the 3,000 people injured.³⁶

The flooding came from an overflow from the Indus River Basin due to monsoons affecting the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan regions of Pakistan. Pakistan is no stranger to flooding from the Indus River Basin because of the river system's propensity to rise and overflow during the monsoon season, and because of the mountain snowmelt runoff from the rise in temperatures during monsoon season.³⁷

³⁵ ReliefWeb. "Pakistan Floods: The Deluge of Disaster - Facts & Figures as of 15 September 2010 - Pakistan." Last modified September 15, 2010. <http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-floodsthe-deluge-disaster-facts-figures-15-september-2010>.

³⁶ Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey G. Engstrom and Abby Doll. Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR146.

³⁷ Haider, Noreen. "Living With Disasters: Disaster profiling of districts of Pakistan." <http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Publications/livingwithdisasters.pdf> (April 4, 2014).



Figure 1: The over flow of the Indus River Basin and the affected area of Pakistan.³⁸

According to the UN and the Pakistani government, requested aid for the relief and recovery of Pakistan was the largest in both the organization's and the country's histories: \$2 billion. Nearly \$600 million came from the US, making it the number-one contributor of aid in response to the catastrophe. Although the two countries have had a rocky relationship due in part to the continued Pakistan-based aid to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan was a vital ally in the region, and it proved more beneficial to aid in the relief effort than not get involved directly.³⁹ US forces were able to respond so quickly because of the proximity of forces stationed in the region. It took relatively little effort for them to transition into Pakistan as soon as the Pakistani government gave permission. The Pakistani government was concerned about granting this approval because of the often-strained relationship with the

³⁸ OCHA. "Pakistan: Situation Overview By Province." Last modified August 20, 2010. <http://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2010-000141-pak> (April 5, 2014).

³⁹ Kronstadt, Alan K., Sheikh, Pervaze A., Vaughn, Bruce. "Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and Issues for Congress," Washington, D.C.: *Congressional Research Service*, p. 5; and United Nations, 2010, p. 124. (November 18, 2010)

US. Their fear was that the IC would take the opportunity not only to use ISR tactics to track the flood movements and devastation, but also to collect intelligence on the Pakistani government and people through surveillance.⁴⁰

As stated above, the US responded to the call for humanitarian aid with swift action. However, there were some aspects of execution that needed improvement. The human response was effective, but the monetary aid was sent in intervals rather than all at once. This caused problems because there was a gap in the necessary funds to combat the devastation. Terrorist and extremist groups filled the gaps created by this time lag, offering aid and assistance in the form of monetary donations and manpower aid.⁴¹

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION METHODS

Since September 11, 2001, the US and Pakistan have maintained a special relationship due to the latter's physical proximity to American interests in the Middle East, particularly Afghanistan, and because of the history Pakistan had with the Taliban.⁴² That history made it the perfect ally to fight against al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates but has also created problems in terms of continuing Pakistani efforts to return the Taliban to power in some capacity. Therefore, the US positioned intelligence officers in the region to gather intelligence on its enemies through multiple methods. One in particular is fostering relationships with potential assets, including the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other intelligence agencies. The Department of State also had assets in the region to

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹ Lynch, Colum. "U.S. sets example by pledging \$60M more to U.N. for Pakistani flood aid." Washington Post. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/19/AR2010081904829.html> (February 11, 2014).

⁴² Niazi, Javed I. *Comparative Analysis of Emergency Response Operations: Haiti Earthquake in January 2010 and Pakistan's Flood in 2010*. Naval PostGraduate School Monterey, CA Dept. of Information Sciences, 2011. (April 4, 2014).

promote peaceful relationships that were capable of mobilization for the IC. These assets became vitally important when the US was called to aid in the HA/DR efforts.

Intelligence officers positioned in the region were meant to combat terrorism by garnering relationships to develop indigenous HUMINT assets and improve the American and US IC reputations in the area. Part of this effort involved minimizing the threat of extremist attacks on refugees, Pakistani government assets, and American and other aid workers. As previously stated, the IC agencies' purpose for being in the region was to protect Pakistan while it served as a strategic ally in the campaign against AQ and its affiliates. This benefited Pakistan because the IC's proximity allowed it to mobilize support for Pakistan within hours of the request⁴³, and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the special relationship with Pakistan through direct support in a time of need. In addition to intelligence officers stationed in the region, the IC was able to utilize indigenous assets and private-sector HUMINT sources (NGOs, IGOs, and private companies) as deputized officers to aid in the collection and dissemination of intelligence to the HA/DR operatives and affected people.

The IC's HUMINT assets also included members of the Pakistani government because of the strong coordination efforts between the two countries. Nonetheless, the Pakistani government feared the US would encroach on its sovereignty without being responsible to the government.⁴⁴ Pakistan also had a disaster-relief agency, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), responsible for coordinating disaster management because of the country's history of natural disasters. The Pakistanis required all aid entities,

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Péchayre, Marion. "Humanitarian Action in Pakistan 2005–2010: Challenges, Principles, and Politics." *Feinstein International Center briefing paper* (2011). (April 1, 2014).

including HUMINT assets, to be responsible to NDMA so it could coordinate all recovery operations.⁴⁵ This provided assistance in information-sharing amongst IC officers and private-sector HUMINT resources, and it provided the level of protection that HUMINT officers were expected to deliver against terrorist and extremist activity, namely AQ and its affiliates and sympathizers.

Technological capabilities were weaker than in previous HA/DR operations in other locations, such as the Haiti earthquake. A major reason for this is that there was little to no use of mobile devices or other satellite-based technologies in the affected areas. Another hindrance was the Pakistani government's attempt to stall GEOINT sources from being publicized.⁴⁶ The government requested that the collected imagery not be offered to the public, but the aid workers and the IC were able to work around Pakistani government barriers to provide GEOINT to the necessary aid sources.

GEOINT sources were still available for tracking the flood progress, including both IC and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellites, and the IC was willing to share intelligence with relief workers if not the general public.⁴⁷ DIA and NASA both provided reconnaissance helicopters and planes (both manned and unmanned) to obtain and supply satellite images of the flood's movements throughout the country.⁴⁸ DIA was able to mobilize air assets from Afghanistan to place them in and over Pakistan, and NASA provided images from satellites above the region. Military personnel, non-military aid organizations, and private NGOs were able to use these GEOINT sources to develop a real-

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Shane, Daniel. "Pulling together in a crisis | Information Age." Information Age - Business technology trends and analysis for IT professionals. Last modified February 28, 2011. <http://www.information-age.com/technology/information-management/1605603/pulling-together-in-a-crisis>.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "U.S. Officials: Pakistan Keeps Up Anti-Islamist Fight Despite Floods," The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2010. (April 5, 2014).

time assessment of flood damage, and to send HA/DR workers to the most affected areas with specific attention to the areas needing the greatest level of protection from extremist activities.⁴⁹

HA/DR-based NGOs and IGOs also had access to a public imagery source, called FloodMAPS, created by Sohaib Khan, a computer science professor at Lahore University of Management Sciences, and sponsored by the provincial government of Punjab, SUPARCO (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission), and the International Growth Centre (IGC). This database gathered images from Google Maps, Google Earth, and other sources to track the flooding's path and devastation.⁵⁰ Because these images did not pass through the government, the IC was able to utilize them as well as IC- and NASA-based GEOINT, provide them to aid workers, and use them as sources of intelligence to watch for extremist activity in the midst of the devastation.

Pakistan was a unique case for open-source gathering and analysis in terms of the IC's ability to aid in HA/DR. The OSINT role and response stemmed primarily from social media preparation and proliferation because there was little to no coverage in traditional media. In fact, 2010 was a trying time for the Western media in terms of covering disasters such as the Haiti earthquake at the beginning of the year along with several others to include Pakistan, and the media believed the American people would not receive the news in a positive fashion.⁵¹ Media outlets thought that the American audience would be fatigued by the perceived constant bombardment of negative news. Also, the Western public was not on good terms with Islamic countries due to the increasing Islamophobic sentiments from the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Middle East conflicts, in addition to the Western media not being interested in the floods.⁵² Therefore, the American-based media outlets were not prepared to run another news cycle covering such a catastrophic event, so the news of the floods came through via social media and, to a lesser extent, international media outlets. The IC was able to relay more accurate and useful intelligence through the same media. The US also did not run the news cycles because of renewed tense relations between the two countries (Pakistan had accused the US of manipulating weather patterns to cause the floods⁵³).

Even without the news coverage, the US was still the lead contributor to volunteer aid because of the plethora of social media sites available to the public. People interested in contributing to the assistance efforts were able to do so through OSINT sources. These included Facebook and Twitter, but also lesser-known sources such as CrisisCommons, HARMONIEweb, and SMS/mobile phone-based sources. These social media sites were used as a source of data sharing because the sites were being used to bring affected people together, and to connect affected people with relief workers. The IC was able to use these sites to gather information and relay information (data-share), through online wiki pages, documents, announcements, and people's knowledge.⁵⁴

⁵² Veda, Mira. "Lack of Media Coverage for Pakistan Floods = Lack of Aid." The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mira-veda/lack-of-media-coverage-fo_b_689380.html (accessed April 16, 2014).

⁵³ Latest Articles. "Pakistani Websites Accuse CIA of Causing Pakistan Flooding: (HAARP is being Used in Pakistan)." Last modified August 28, 2010. <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2579358/posts>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

THE PROTECTIVE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Terrorist activity in Pakistan was at a high point in 2010.⁵⁵ AQ and its affiliates were allegedly using Pakistan as a safe haven. The Afghan Taliban was gaining momentum in Pakistan during this time, and had successfully created a Pakistan sect. The Taliban was even maintaining a relationship with the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).⁵⁶ This posed a threat to US supporters and American interests in the region, and increased the potential for an attack during the floods. That potential created a need for security against a terrorist attack that could cause greater devastation to an already distressed region.

Figure 2: The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border⁵⁷



There were serious security concerns about the potential for an accompanying attack in the affected areas because of the level of terrorist activity in Pakistan and the proximity of terrorist safe havens and resources. The activity even extended to HA/DR efforts, as some of the financial aid provided to Pakistan was linked to terrorist and extremist organizations.

⁵⁵ Sharif, Farhan, and Khurram Anis. "Pakistan's Terrorist Attacks Since Jan. 1, 2010: A Timeline." Bloomberg. Last modified December 4, 2010. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-15/pakistan-s-terrorist-attacks-since-jan-1-2010-a-timeline.html>.

⁵⁶ Gura, David. 2010. "Pakistan Maintains Relationship With Afghan Taliban, Harvard Researcher Says." Podcast audio. NPR. June 15, 2010. Accessed April 8, 2014. <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/06/15/127861314/waldman-pakistan-taliban-isi-afghanistan-harvard-carr-center-ksg>.

⁵⁷ Wikimedia Upload. "GAO-USAID Map of Pakistan and Afghanistan." Last modified April 23, 2008. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/GAO-USAID_Map_of_Pakistan_and_Afghanistan.PNG.

This series of concerns caused worries for both affected citizens and the organizations involved in providing assistance, namely because refusing aid was not an option for affected Pakistanis regardless of its source. The international community (especially the US) was swift in its efforts to provide HA/DR, but it was not provided all at once. The aid from the US, both financial and human capital, was sent in waves, leaving Pakistan in need of aid from any and all willing sources. One source in particular, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was a large contributor to the relief efforts. Several NGO relief workers claimed they were spreading an ideology of terrorism while providing supplemental aid, which either directly endangered Western-based relief workers or made them feel at greater risk of attack.⁵⁸

The government was hesitant to accept direct protection measures from the international community because it believed that Pakistani security and intelligence assets should be the sole protective agents for relief workers. However, the workers did not have the same faith in the Pakistani government.⁵⁹ The Pakistani Prime Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, simply requested that more funds be sent to the country, claiming that terrorist organizations constantly work to take advantage of such disasters. He believed that the government was prepared to handle direct advances, and the additional monetary assistance would put the Pakistani government in a position to reject aid offers from extremist groups.⁶⁰

Another security concern was for intelligence assets in the region who happened to be women, ethnic minorities, and/or Christians. These groups were not the most favored in Pakistan, and the distress from the disaster led to citizens turning on each other. This was

⁵⁸ Sen, Ashish K. "Terror-linked charities pitch in to Pakistani flood relief effort." *Washington Times* (Washington, DC), August 6, 2010. Accessed April 8, 2014. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/6/in-pakistan-flood-relief-terror-linked-charities-a/?page=all>.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Varner, Bill. "Pakistan Flood Aid Helps Fight Terrorism as Peace 'Fragile,' Qureshi Says." *Bloomberg*, August 20, 2010. Accessed April 8, 2014. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-20/pakistan-flood-aid-helps-fight-terrorism-as-peace-fragile-qureshi-says.html>.

especially difficult because the rule of law was becoming increasingly fragile due to continued threats to the government from extremist sects meaning to cause harm to women as well as ethnic and religious minority groups. This, compounded with the distress from the flood, caused a threat to marginalized citizen groups.⁶¹

IC INTERACTIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (PAKISTAN)

US intelligence, in conjunction with the US government, has had a tumultuous relationship with the international community regarding American actions in the Middle East, including Pakistan (a key ally in the region). Although the US pledged protection to Pakistan from the Taliban and terrorist organizations, the US never fully trusted that Pakistan was committed to the alliance. Therefore, the US used the IC to keep eyes on the country's interactions with other countries in the region, and to develop productive and reliable relationships with key states and non-state actors in the region.⁶²

These concerns have been validated countless times with Pakistan's leniency toward the Taliban and its allies (LeT, etc.).⁶³ The Pakistani government has also been less than forthcoming with information about these extremist organizations with which it maintains relations, and forbids DIA/military intelligence officers to pass through Pakistan to get to other countries in the region (e.g. Afghanistan). The ISI and Pakistani military have, instead, publicly attempted to form an alliance with Afghanistan, both the official government and the Taliban, to provide assistance with containing extremist organizations.⁶⁴ The international

⁶¹ Refugees International. "Refugees International Statement On Pakistan: More Protection Needed." Home Page | Refugees International. Last modified August 19, 2010. <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/press-room/press-release/refugees-international-statement-pakistan-more-protection-needed>.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Fair, C. Christine. "Pakistan in 2010: Flooding, Governmental Inefficiency, and Continued Insurgency." *Asian Survey* 51, no. 1 (2011): 97-110. Accessed March 25, 2014.

http://www.relooney.fatcow.com/SI_Expeditionary/Pakistan-Floods_41.pdf.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

community has maintained the assumption that this alliance building is Pakistan's attempt to decrease its reliance on the US.

At the same time, the Pakistani government was not convinced that the US was not using agents stationed in the country against the Pakistani government, especially since the IC does not divulge information about their operatives and their operations. This sentiment was prevalent not only among government officials, but also among the majority of Pakistani citizens.⁶⁵ These allegations, although not proven, are not without merit. The IC has been party to remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) missions, which were state sanctioned in the more rural areas of Pakistan, despite the fact that RPV activity creates fear of activity elsewhere in the country.⁶⁶ This Pakistani concern about the uses of RPVs and other intelligence-collection and strike assets was further validated the following year, when the IC was able to locate OBL on Pakistani soil and direct a SEAL team his location, leading to his death and immense Pakistani embarrassment.

At the end of the day, however, the IC and Pakistan were dependent on each other's resources. Pakistan required continued assistance against radical movements in the midst of the flood, and assistance against general flood patterns. Conversely, the IC required access to Pakistan because of its proximity to Afghanistan, and the openness between the two countries (Pakistan and Afghanistan). Their mutual reliance kept the two entities at a perpetual stalemate but generally cooperative regarding HA/DR efforts.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ White, Stacey. *The 2010 Flooding Disaster in Pakistan: An Opportunity for Governance Reform or another Layer of Dysfunction?*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011. Accessed April 9, 2014. https://csis.org/files/publication/110930_White_2010FloodDisasterPakistan.pdf.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

THE 7 JULY 2005 (“7/7”) LONDON BOMBINGS

Unlike the previous case study, the July 7, 2005 London Bombings (or 7/7 as they were colloquially referred to) were elements of a man-made, multi-coordinated event. This was a suicide mission that included three explosions of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on the London Underground train system (Russell Square, Aldgate, and Edgware Road), and one on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. The attack occurred during the morning rush hour for maximum damage, and the four incidents occurred within the span of an hour (from 0850-0947 BST). They resulted in 52 fatalities and 700 injured, in addition to the four suicide bombers.⁶⁸




Figure 3: locations of each detonation⁶⁹

This was the first mass-casualty attack in Great Britain (or United Kingdom, UK) since the decline of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Unlike the IRA-orchestrated attacks, this one involved suicide bombers. Also, unlike the 9/11 attackers, the perpetrators were not

⁶⁸ Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. *Return to an Address of the Honorable the House of Commons Dated 11th May 2006 for the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*. London: Stationery Office, 2006. Accessed April 9, 2014.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf.

⁶⁹ Wikimedia Upload. "London Bombing Locations." Last modified May 20, 2006.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/7_July_London_bombings_locations.png.

affiliated with a terrorist network. Although AQ attempted to claim responsibility for the attacks, the bombers were not acting in concert with the organization. They were a new form of terrorist group called “homegrown terrorists”, meaning that they were influenced by the actions of radical terrorists, but they were citizens of their target countries.⁷⁰ In this case, the attackers were British citizens.

It also differed greatly from the previous case because President George W. Bush was in the country for the 2005 G-8 Summit, the yearly summit of the 8 leading industrialized nations’ leaders (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and USA, plus the European Commission).⁷¹ The president’s presence in the country was a cause for concern in the IC even though he was in a different area of the country (Gleneagles, Scotland). However, it is easy and relatively quick to travel to and from London from Scotland, as well as other places throughout the UK.⁷² This, compounded with the multi-dimensional attack in London, left a reasonable fear that another attack was possible. Such an attack would be particularly unnerving because the leaders of the world’s most powerful states were gathered in the same location.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION METHODS

The UK and US had joint operations for disaster relief and emergency management during the aftermath of 7/7. The IC’s role was scaled back because British intelligence agencies, MI-5 and MI-6 (military intelligence, sections 5 and 6), have domestic protection protocols in place, and the British intelligence force is one of the most developed

⁷⁰ Sageman, Marc. "Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3, no. 4 (2009).

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² VisitScotland. "Travel to Scotland from England & Wales by train, bus, car or plane." Accessed April 8, 2014. <http://www.visitscotland.com/en-us/travel/to-scotland/england-wales/>.

organizations in the international community.⁷³ This strength and preparedness is in large part due to the experience of numerous previous bombings by the IRA (pre-9/11 attacks). However, the British intelligence agencies did not have as much experience as the IC when it came to combatting al-Qaeda operations. This was relevant because the prevailing belief at the time was that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack (it was later determined that they were not responsible).⁷⁴ Because of the strength of MI-5 and MI-6, the IC took the role of support intelligence in the aftermath. This support was evident in the interactions with locals who witnessed the attacks.

Not only were there countless witnesses, but there were also ordinary citizens in close proximity to the attacks who responded along with law-enforcement responders. These witnesses and responders were extremely helpful in forming an assessment of events.⁷⁵ IC officers then turned over these assessments to their British counterparts and British law-enforcement agencies. This type of HUMINT was not typical of these types of attacks because in previous bombings, the type of profiling intelligence gathered from locals was not a factor (the Irish have the same physical characteristics as white British citizens). The IC was accustomed to handling the type of profiling information required for such extremist incidents.⁷⁶

The IC and British intelligence forces worked together to gain intelligence through interception as well as through personal connections. This was done most clearly through

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Brothers, Karin. "The 7/7 London Bombings and MI5's "Stepford Four" Operation: How the 2005 London Bombings Turned every Muslim into a "Terror Suspect"." Global Research. Last modified July 7, 2013. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-77-london-bombings-and-mi5s-stepford-four-operation-how-the-2005-london-bombings-turned-every-muslim-into-a-terror-suspect/5341948>.

⁷⁵ Abernathy, Paul, et. al. "Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: The London and Madrid Subway Bombings of 2005 and 2004." (2006): 9-25.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

obtaining CCTV (closed circuit television) footage.⁷⁷ The IC was able to gather footage to determine the perpetrators' actions in the hours leading up to and during the attacks. This footage aided in the determination that there were no further explosions expected to occur, and that the perpetrators did work in concert to carry out the attacks.

Because of the closeness of the Anglo-American relationship, the American-based world media outlets were inundated with stories of the London incident. Like 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 7/7 bombing showed the international community what type of enemy the international community was fighting, and that made the attack an important news story. This afforded the IC a platform for OSINT gathering, especially since there was not a large social media presence at the time of the attack. The only social media presence at the time of the attack was blog presence. When the attack occurred, people who had access to blogs used the online presence to confirm injury status, and to provide details of the incident that could only be provided by witnesses and victims.⁷⁸ The traditional news outlets provided a vehicle through which the IC found people who knew the attackers and could provide knowledge of both the motives behind the attacks and the potential for future planned attacks.

There is little knowledge of GEOINT use in the HA/DR operations in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings. This is likely because of the classified nature of the operations. The IC answered the call of the immediate emergency but also launched an operations-based investigation that is not available to researchers.

⁷⁷ The Guardian. "London bombings - the blogger response | News | theguardian.com." Last modified May 5, 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13301195>.

⁷⁸ Pickard, Anna. "London bombings - the blogger response | News | theguardian.com." the Guardian. Last modified July 7, 2005. <http://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2005/jul/07/londonbombings1>.

THE PROTECTIVE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Although the IC and its British counterpart did not successfully predict and prevent the attack, they took immediate action to assess the damage, and determine whether another attack was eminent. This rapid action occurred because the IC felt the effects of both the physical and emotional destruction left by the attack. US action against terrorism was largely bilateral with the UK, and an attack that could not be stopped, or to which there was no effective response, placed strains on the alliance.⁷⁹

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the US IC began efforts to form joint initiatives with British counterparts to combat increasingly extremist behaviors and organizations. These programs were based on initiatives begun in the US in the aftermath of 9/11, and had proven effective in preventing radicalization. They were meant to be solely for protection through prevention and deterrence measures and were not to be used for intelligence gathering.^{80*} The British believed that using these programs as intelligence-gathering methods would deter their efficacy.

The US also created a medium for information sharing with its counterparts to ensure continued communication and provide support for the British leadership.⁸¹ This was to keep the US involved in decision-making process without appearing to take over command. The

⁷⁹ Mix, Derek E. "The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations." *Congressional Research Service* (2013): 1-15. Accessed April 17, 2014. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33105.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Bacci, David. "A Counter Terrorism Analysis of WikiLeaks." *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (2013): Accessed April 13, 2014. http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=0pgwgrMh_eY%3d&tabid=426.

⁸¹ Strom, Kevin J., and Joe Eyerman. "Interagency Coordination: A Case Study of the 2005 London Train Bombings." *National Institute of Justice Journal* no. 260 (2008): Accessed April 9, 2014. <http://www.nij.gov/journals/260/pages/interagency-coordination.aspx>.

* Although I do not condone the actions of WikiLeaks, its staff and its sources, the information is now in the public domain and therefore it is important to analyze the contents of the materials.

communications that the IC provided gave British forces necessary information to protect British citizens, both from future attacks and from the chaos of the incident's aftermath.

IC INTERACTIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (UNITED KINGDOM)

The IC maintains a healthy, interactive relationship with MI-5, MI-6, and the British government because of the long-standing alliance that began during World War II and continued during the Cold War. One of the most critical elements of the alliance involves intelligence sharing. This "special relationship," as intelligence personnel in both countries call it, has played a central role in the alliance.⁸² In fact, the "special relationship" continues today and serves as a medium for communication and joint operations for the two countries.

The IC and its British counterparts partake in a system of reciprocity in terms of their alliance against adversaries. This is because partnering with the US has been an enhancement to the UK's global influence since the break-up of the British Empire. In return, the UK's support provides international credibility to US policies and initiatives along with very deep intelligence expertise. The "War on Terrorism", and by extension the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, are the most recent example of this reciprocity. The UK and US formed a coalition that comprised of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) country forces that agreed to initiate the "War on Terror".⁸³

This is because the two countries share in the role of Western influence, the US because of its role as a "superpower" and the UK because of its former colonial influence

⁸² Wither, James. "An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the Early Twenty-first Century." *European Security* 15, no. 1 (2006): 47-65.

⁸³ Ibid.

over one-fifth of the world's territory⁸⁴ and its current influence over 14 territories.⁸⁵ The IC-UK relationship serves as a living memory of the two countries' allied history. This seemingly obligatory alliance, although successful for both countries' global stakes, has not always been the most popular strategy amongst the American and British people.

The UK has a strong intelligence network, but it is not as large or powerful as the IC, and this has caused a great shift in the balance of power in favor of the US. This has come to be an aggravation among British citizens specifically because the people have been more critical of our government's secret operations than have American citizens.⁸⁶ Most British are also less in favor of IC actions to maintain national security, to include keeping Guantanamo Bay open and engaging in enhanced interrogation techniques, although British citizens were ok with it when it was against IRA members.

Regardless of temporary tensions that arise, the governments always reaffirm their commitment to the "special relationship" when there is a transition of power. The US IC-UK MI-5/MI-6 relationship serves as a reminder of the 'special relationship' of the two countries' allied history, and most analysts believe that it will remain a strong, vital alliance.

⁸⁴ Maddison, Angus. *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*. Paris, France: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001.

⁸⁵ Gapes, Mike. *HC Paper 147-II House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Overseas Territories, Volume II*. London: The Stationery Office, 2008.

http://books.google.com/books?id=HhsZSMEH5DoC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The case studies examined in this work are meant to determine two central points: whether the IC's involvement in HA/DR operations was a primary or secondary function regarding their intelligence-gathering focus, and whether the IC showed more substantial involvement in natural or man-made disasters. The precise extent of the IC's involvement in these natural and man-made disasters is still unknown because of clearance issues, both domestic and international. The IC's operations are classified, and detailed knowledge is on a need-to-know basis. This means that information about past and active operations is limited for a predetermined amount of time, and therefore cannot be examined in great depth. As a result, a detailed explanation, at times, requires speculation based on past actions. The IC's past actions and operations have formed a trend that can be followed for current and future operations. The information on the cases is also subject to approval by the countries' governments. The UK is responsible for releasing fully detailed reports on the incidents, and Pakistan is responsible for releasing the information on the flood devastation because they have jurisdiction over the affected regions.

Substantial involvement gave the IC the ability to play a major role in aiding the efforts to minimize the effects of disasters and preparing HA/DR workers to mobilize and act in a timely manner without being seen as an antagonistic force engaged in espionage. The IC showed that there is not only a place for its operations in HA/DR efforts, but that it is necessary because of the protection aspect of these efforts. The actions of the IC in these cases demonstrate that its primary functions of protecting national security and American interests are aligned with the proposed functions within HA/DR operations, meaning that it

the two functions are not mutually exclusive. Involvement in HA/DR operations is a primary function because it protects national security and American foreign interests.

This is because the current enemy's strategy and techniques thrive in chaotic situations that can be created in both natural and man-made disasters. The US is home to many humanitarian agencies and NGOs, so it is in the interest of national security that the IC protects and prepares these organizations to avoid potential threats. Furthermore, the IC is able to form bonds with governments and local organizations during HA/DR operations to develop intelligence assets in the affected countries.

In terms of what comprises "substantial" involvement, the IC's actions were not more substantial in the natural disasters than in man-made disasters. We cannot state definitively that one style of disaster shows more substantial involvement from the IC because there are different aspects of each that the IC's primary functions are tailored to address.

In the case of involvement in London and Pakistan, the analyses showed that the IC used more of its capabilities in the HA/DR efforts in Pakistan, but had fewer overt restrictions in London. This is a result of both the nature and the locations of the incidents. There was already a long-held relationship between British and American intelligence, and the IC was prepared to aid in protection and stabilization in the aftermath of the attack. However, it did little in the way of HA/DR because the incident was so isolated, and the immediate impact only spanned the city of London. The IC had a less cordial relationship with the ISI, but the two groups were also able to cooperate in the midst of the conflict in order to accelerate HA/DR efforts in Pakistan. Though the two intelligence forces worked together, cooperation only occurred in the background.

The IC was able to provide the necessary assets and assistance to the humanitarian organizations and the Pakistani government in its efforts to protect citizens from harm in the floods, and from potential harm from extremist groups in the region. The IC showed substantial involvement in the man-made event by minimizing the effects and providing protection by preparing against further attacks. The IC showed substantial involvement in the natural-disaster event through aiding relief workers by providing assets and information, and by presenting relief workers as non-antagonistic entities.

In the two previous chapters, we examined cases of the IC's efforts within international HA/DR operations, and underscored the IC's substantial involvement in both cases. The two cases also showed similarities to several domestic catastrophic events. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the tragic events of September 11, 2001 at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon bore similarities to the Pakistan and London cases, and a brief comparative analysis of these events with those in Pakistan and London make it evident how and where the IC would be useful in supporting post-event HA/DR operations not just abroad, but also in the US with Congressional and Executive approvals. The following comparative analysis of the IC operations in Pakistan and London will allow us to link key developments and results to events in the two domestic cases.

Both of these incidents and the conditions under which they occurred were vastly different, but they were also similar in that they were both directly related to US interests abroad. This made them national security concerns requiring IC intervention. However, the means by which the IC functioned in each country was dependent on the relationship it and the larger U.S. Government had with the country, and with the type of catastrophic event.

In the case of Pakistan, the incident was a natural disaster rather than an attack. The heavy rain lasted several months, and resulted in devastating flooding. The flooding affected nearly the entire country because of the overflow of the Indus River, which runs nearly the length of Pakistan. The country was a US ally and was in a strategic location at the time of the flood. With the help of the IC and other agencies, the US was able quickly to respond to Pakistan's request for assistance.

Intelligence operations were already active in the country and in surrounding countries because of Pakistan's proximity to US operations in Afghanistan. In addition, the IC was gaining intelligence on potential attacks by terrorist organizations active in the region at the time of the flood. This laid the foundation for all intelligence collection methods to be used in US involvement in HA/DR relief and security efforts. This was particularly helpful since the majority of Western traditional news sources barely covered the floods. The IC and foreign citizens, however, were able to gain access to information on the flood patterns and the status of affected people through social media, and were able to donate money and services through such sources.

Although the US and Pakistan were allies, the relationship was tense because of the close relationship Pakistan has with Afghanistan-based Taliban and other belligerents. This relationship was in direct opposition to the alliance with the US because of the war going on in Afghanistan between the US and the Taliban. Also, the Pakistani government did not fully trust the US because of espionage operations within Pakistan.

In spite of these complications between the two countries, the IC was able to employ intelligence sources in the region and satellite images to provide information to both the

country and relief workers in order to ensure protection and successful HA/DR functions. Also, the IC had the ability to disseminate information through social media channels.

In contrast, the London case was an orchestrated attack by a small group of radicalized British citizens, rather than a natural disaster. The attackers were suicide bombers who detonated IEDs concealed in backpacks.⁸⁷ The number of victims was significantly lower in London at 52 dead and 700 injured (as opposed to 2000 dead and 3000 injured in Pakistan), and there were no displaced individuals from the attack (as opposed to 20 million displaced people in Pakistan). The attack occurred on a single day during morning rush hour, as opposed to months of accumulated crisis in Pakistan, and consisted of four detonations, three on the London Underground and one on a double-decker bus. Although it did not physically damage all of the UK, it confirmed the need for better intelligence capabilities to combat extremist attacks in the country and their aftermaths.

Similarly to Pakistan, the US was allies with the UK at the time of the attack, but unlike the relationship with Pakistan the IC worked in concert with British intelligence. The IC had a history of joint operations with MI-5 and MI-6 because of the “special relationship” between the two countries during World War II and the Cold War, and because of the alliance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IC also had concerns about the attack because of its proximity to the G-8 conference occurring in the country at the same time. The past relationship and the style of attack, however, minimized the concern of the IC interfering with British Intelligence jurisdiction, and promoted a cooperative relationship during the investigation and action.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

The IC was very helpful in the aftermath of the attack because it was able to use intelligence collection-based assets stationed in the country to gather information on the perpetrators and on the bombing scenes. They were also able to work with law enforcement to maintain a flow of information between the two entities and intercept signals from communications apparatuses and surveillance systems, such as CCTV. These actions and assets allowed the IC to gather information on the attackers, their plans and reasons for the attack, and whether there were future attacks planned.

Unlike the IC's assets in Pakistan, the IC had little to do with social media and satellite imaging. This is largely due to the fact that any imagery used in the 7/7 case is still classified (both by the US and the UK), and social media were not as widely used in 2005 as it was in 2010. In 2005 social media did exist but were considered a fad and therefore were not yet as prevalent as in 2010 during the Pakistan floods. Western media outlets did, however, cover the attacks with much greater fervor than the minimal coverage of the Pakistan floods.

The examined cases also show similarities to two domestic cases that were equally (if not more) catastrophic in nature, and the IC's involvement in these examined cases also show similarities to the involvement in the domestic cases. These two instances are Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. Even a brief comparison of the overseas and domestic disasters reveals that there is a need for greater IC involvement in both natural and man-made disasters, both domestic and international. While the domestic aspect is beyond the scope of this work, it is worth briefly mentioning.

Hurricane Katrina caused mass devastation to the Gulf region, just as floodwaters caused mass devastation to Pakistan. It was a dangerous storm that ravaged the Gulf region

of the U.S. in August of 2005. It struck New Orleans, the location of the greatest devastation, on August 29, 2005.⁸⁸ The storm caused 1,833 fatalities and \$108 billion in damages, and left 15 million people negatively affected.⁸⁹ The numbers were almost identical to the destruction from the Pakistan floods.

Katrina was a major hurricane, but a Category 3 hurricane does not produce the type of damage that occurred in the Gulf without outside, contributing factors. By the time the hurricane hit, it had fallen from Category 5 status (catastrophic damage guaranteed) to Category 3 (devastating damage guaranteed).⁹⁰ The hurricane did contribute greatly to the devastation of the Gulf region in the US, but the majority of the destruction came from the flooding as a result of the levee breakage. Levees were built around the city of New Orleans because it was in the middle of hurricane country along the north-central portion of the Gulf of Mexico. This made the levees necessary because the city is below sea level.

The levees were a concern from the beginning because of the potential for the water to rise above them, but the government did not believe the waters would break through the levees as they did.⁹¹ When they broke the water flooded the city, submerging it in water and debris. This produced a deadly situation for the affected citizens. Similarly, the 2010 monsoon and resulting floods that caused the destruction in Pakistan were as devastating as Hurricane Katrina was to the areas it affected.

These two disasters had similar characteristics, despite Katrina being a smaller incident and occurring in a more advanced country. However, Louisiana was not prepared

⁸⁸ National Hurricane Center. "Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale." Last modified May 24, 2013. <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Associated Press. "Transcripts, tape show Bush, Brown warned on Katrina." CNN International. Last modified March 2, 2006. <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/02/fema.tapes/index.html>.

for this degree of disaster. Both disasters were produced and exacerbated by their respective climates, as they are both in regions that are prone to heavy rains and severe weather events. The lack of natural barriers to block the water from reaching the communities in New Orleans also proved to hasten the disaster, although the lack of natural barriers in Pakistan was due to human interference. The forests that would have slowed the floodwaters had been destroyed previously due to deforestation.⁹² The two disasters also resulted in close to 2000 deaths and affected millions of other people.⁹³ The death toll and the costs of damages from both incidents also resulted in their being named the worst natural disasters in their respective countries' histories.

It is apparent that the IC was involved in the Pakistan flood HA/DR operations, but it is not as apparent that intelligence was involved in the HA/DR operations for Katrina. The agencies involved were different than the ones involved in Pakistan because Katrina was a domestic event, but they had similar functions. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was one of the agencies involved providing evacuation support and eyes on the ground for the federal government.⁹⁴ The IC also provided satellite imagery during Katrina to map the damage from the hurricane and subsequent flooding, as it had done during the Pakistan floods. Unlike the Pakistan case, however, Katrina HA/DR operations used signals intelligence (SIGINT).

The National Security Agency (NSA) obtained special permission from the President to intercept signals and use surveillance measures under SIGINT to find people lost in the

⁹² Cedar, Oded. "A Failure of Conscience: How Pakistan's Devastating Floods Compare to America's Experience During Katrina." *Sustainable Development Law & Policy* 11, no. 1 (2011): 46. Accessed April 8, 2014. <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1453&context=sdlp>.

⁹³ <http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/lib/lib1/nhclib/mwreviews/2005.pdf>

⁹⁴ Ripley, Amanda. "Hurricane Katrina: How The Coast Guard Gets It Right." *Time*, October 23, 2005. Accessed April 26, 2014. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1122007-2,00.html>.

commotion, and to reconnect family members in the midst of the confusion.⁹⁵ This was an unusual circumstance because no warrants were needed since no crimes had occurred, but it set the foundation for the argument for greater NSA involvement in domestic HA/DR operations.

The 9/11 attacks, on the other hand, mirror the 7/7 London attack. They were a series of four coordinated, mass-casualty attacks that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda extremists hijacked four passenger airliners, and used them to carry out their attacks. Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and one into the Pentagon (the headquarters of DOD). There was also a plane that was later determined to be headed for the White House in Washington, DC, but crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania after the passengers tried to overcome the hijackers.⁹⁶ The attacks resulted in almost 3,000 deaths and over 6,000 injuries, surpassing the only similarly devastating attack in US history, on Pearl Harbor, a US territory at the time of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack. This makes the atrocity even more significant because it targeted civilians and historic representations of American institutions (i.e. wealth and military strength) instead of definitive military assets. The AQ terrorist network, an Islamic fundamentalist extremist organization, carried out these attacks and it ushered the US into the era of counter- and anti-terrorism based combat.

Similarly to the London attack, the 9/11 attacks consisted of four orchestrated events that were carried out at four different locations. Also, the attacks were carried out in the morning to maximize the damage. However, 9/11 was carried out by a group of 19 AQ

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ YouTube. "Inside 9/11: Zero Hour." *BBC News*. September 11, 2007. Accessed April 21, 2014. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZktzjE-4RXg>.

hijackers rather than four individuals. Although the attack comprised four events, it occurred in multiple locations within the US rather than four locations within one city. Also, the perpetrators were a part of AQ rather than simply being inspired by them. This resulted in more perpetrators and greater loss than the 7/7 attack.

In the 9/11 case, the IC was not required to be subordinate to other organizations since they had jurisdiction. The FBI and the military were in charge of handling the aftermath of the attack because they occurred on U.S. soil and, in the case of the Pentagon, against DoD facilities. Just like MI-5 and MI-6 involvement, the IC was responsible for coordinating joint operations with local law-enforcement agencies because of the resources they were able to provide. These were closer to the human assets than the IC so they provided information on how the attacks played out.

The IC was able to also obtain permission to use SIGINT by intercepting phone conversations and other communication links to gain information on potential future attacks and on the recent ones. This permission came in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001).⁹⁷ The extent of IC authority was much greater than in the aftermath of the 7/7 attack because the gravity of 9/11 was greater.

Just as was the case with 7/7, 9/11 did not involve much social media because it was not prominent at the time of the attacks, but traditional media outlets were flooded with stories of the attacks. This provided the international community with information on the attacks, as it did for intelligence officers not at the various locations at the time of the attacks.

⁹⁷ 107th Congress. *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001*. US Congress, 2001. Accessed April 27, 2014. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/jureeka/index.php?doc=USPubLaws&cong=107&no=56>.

In both cases the IC's main function in the aftermath had less to do with disaster relief, and more to do with protection from future attacks and investigating the attack to determine the motives. The IC did, however, provide assistance to the affected in 9/11 because the DOD-based intelligence agencies were stationed at the Pentagon at the time of the attack.

These comparatives demonstrate that there is ample room for IC involvement in domestic as well as international HA/DR events. They make it abundantly clear that these topics are rich ground for further research on the part of the scholarly and intelligence communities. The President has the ability to insert IC operations into domestic situations, especially since 9/11, and there have been countless instances of legislation to reinforce this (including the USA PATRIOT ACT, 2007 Defense Authorization Bill, and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012).⁹⁸ While IC engagement with domestic HA/DR is not the focus of this work, it is abundantly clear that it requires further research and the incorporation of findings into IC operations, both overseas and in the US.

⁹⁸ Warner, John. *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (2006; 109th Congress H.R. 5122)*. US Congress, 2007. Accessed April 30, 2014. <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5122>.

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[every-muslim-into-a-terror-suspect/5341948](http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-77-london-bombings-and-mi5s-stepford-four-operation-how-the-2005-london-bombings-turned-every-muslim-into-a-terror-suspect/5341948).

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APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

7/7 – July 7, 2005 London Bombings

9/11 - September 11, 2001

AQ – al-Qaeda

BST – British Summer Time

CCTV – Closed Circuit Television

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

DHS – Department of Homeland Security

DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD – Department of Defense

G-8 – Group of 8 leading industrialized nations

GEOINT – Geospatial Intelligence

HA/DR – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

HIU – Humanitarian Information Unit

HUMINT – Human Intelligence

IC – Intelligence Community

IED – Improvised Explosive Devices

IGC – International Growth Centre

IGO – International Governmental Organization

IMINT – Imagery Intelligence

IRA – Irish Republican Army

ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence

ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JSOC – Joint Special Operations Command

LeT - Lashkar-e-Taiba

MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction

MI-5 – Military Intelligence, Section 5: Security Service

MI-6 – Military Intelligence, Section 6: Secret Intelligence Service

NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NBC – Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NDMA – National Disaster Management Agency

NGA – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NSA 1947 – National Security Act of 1947

NSA – National Security Agency

NSC – National Security Council

OBL – Osama bin Laden

OSINT – Open Source Intelligence

SIGINT – Signal Intelligence

SMS – Short Message Service

SUPARCO - Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

UK – Great Britain or United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

US – United States

USA PATRIOT Act - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USSOCCOM – US Special Operations Command

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Soviet Union

WTC – World Trade Center

WWII – World War Two